JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The following joint resolution adopted by the legislature of Delaware on April 11, 1873, is interesting as showing the feeling at this time in a State outside of the South:
'"That the members of this general assembly, for the people they represent, and for themselves, jointly and individually, do hereby declare uncompromising opposition to a proposed act of congress, introduced by Hon. Charles Sumner at the last session, and now on file in the senate of the United States, known as the supplemental civil rights bill, and all other measures intended or calculated to equalize or amalgamate the negro race with the white race, politically or socially, and especially do they proclaim unceasing opposition to making negroes eligible to public offices, to sit on juries, and to their admission into public schools where white children attend, to their admission on terms of equality with white people in churches, public conveyances, places of amusement, or hotels, and to any and every measure designed or having the effect to promote the equality of the negro with the white man in any of the relations of life, or which may by possibility conduce to such result.
"That our senators in congress be instructed, and our representatives requested to vote against and use all honorable means to defeat the passage by congress of the bill referred to in the foregoing resolution, known as the supplemental civil rights bill; and all other measures of a kindred nature, and any and every attempt to make the negro the peer of the white man" [Laws of Delaware, 1871-73, pp. 686-687].
THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS BILL OF 1875
The federal civil rights bill of 1875 was the highwater mark of legislation to protect persons of color in the enjoyment of the rights of citizenship. In 1868, the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution was proclaimed to be in force, the first section of which reads: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Presuming that such action was authorized by this first section of the fourteenth amendment, congress, on March 1, 1875, passed the civil rights bill, the interesting sections of which are: Section 1. "That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude. [ante] of the civil rights bill were unconstitutional for these reasons: Firstly, they were not authorized by the thirteenth amendment, abolishing and prohibiting slavery, because the separation of the races in public places and conveyances is not a badge of servitude. He says, " It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal with the other matters of intercourse or business." Secondly, they are not authorized by the fourteenth amendment because that refers to State action, while the civil rights bill refers to individuals. It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. "Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the amendment It does not authorize congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide methods of redress against the operation of State laws . . . until some State law has been passed, or some State action through its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the fourteenth amendment, no legislation of the United States under said amendment nor any proceeding under such legislation can be called into activity; for the prohibitions of the amendment are against State laws and acts done under State authority." Thus, the power of congress to interfere with individuals in this matter was denied, and they were left free to make such regulations for the transportation of passengers as they saw fit, so long as they did not violate the State laws and so long as the State laws did not violate the federal laws.
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STATE LEGISLATION GROWING OUT OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
The impotence of the federal government under the decisions in the civil rights cases encouraged the States to take the matter into their own hands. Those States which opposed all racial distinctions virtually copied the civil rights bill. Those which believed that the races should be separated in public places and conveyances proceeded to pass laws to that effect, always taking care to keep within the pale of the Federal Constitution (especially the fourteenth amendment) by providing that the accommodations for both races be equal.
On In 1865, a colored woman ejected from a street car in Philadelphia brought action against the conductor, who pleaded that there was a rule established by the road superintendent that negroes were to be excluded from the cars. The court held that the conductor had no right to eject a passenger on account of color or race, and that a regulation of the company would not protect him from liability in damages [Derry v. Lowry, 6 Phila. Rep., 30].
Just a few days after the Pennsylvania legislature passed the act prohibiting discriminations against persons of color in public conveyances [ante] , the supreme court of the State ruled that it was not an unreasonable regulation of the railroad company to separate the passengers so as to promote personal comfort and convenience [West Chester and Phila. Railroad Co. v. Mills, 55 Pa. State Rep., 209]. This is interesting because it is the earliest case found supporting the separation of the races in public conveyances. Since the case arose before the civil rights act of the State was adopted, it does not purport to rule upon the constitutionality of that act.
In San Francisco, in 1868, a street car conductor refused to stop for a colored woman, saying, "We don't take colored people in the cars," whereupon she brought an action and recovered $500 in damages [Pleasant v there were two cars equally fit and appropriate, then the white and colored passengers might be separated. These are only a few of the many cases which arose between 1865 and 1881, involving the separation of white and colored passengers; they are cited to show that, in the absence of legislative authority, many of the public conveyance companies had regulations separating the races. In other words, the Jim Crow laws, when they came, did scarcely more than to legalize an existing and widespread custom.
As already suggested, the Jim Crow laws apply to three classes of vehicles-namely, the steamboat, the railroad car, and the street car. Those concerning steamboats will be treated first because they are the least general.
THE SEPARATION OF WHITE AND COLORED PASSENGERS ON STEAMBOATS
There is comparatively little legislation about white and colored passengers on steamboats. North Carolina is the only State to include steamboats in the regular Jim Crow law [Public Laws of North Carolina, 1899, pp. 539-540]. All steamboat companies engaged as common carriers in the transportation of passengers for hire shall provide separate but equal accommodations for the white and colored races on all steamboats carrying passengers. The violation of this law is punishable by a fine of $100. Each day is considered a separate offense.
On February 9, 1900, the Virginia legislature enacted a statute requiring the separation of white and colored passengers on all steamboats carrying passengers and plying in the waters within the jurisdiction of the State in the sitting, sleeping, and eating apartments, so far as the "construction of the boat and due consideration for comfort of passengers" would permit. There should be no difference in the quality of the accommodations. The law made exception of nurses and attendants traveling with their employers and officers in charge of prisoners. For disobeying the law, the boat officer was guilty of a misdemeanor to be punished by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $100. The passenger disobeying the law was guilty of a misdemeanor to be punished by a fine of not less than $5 nor more than $50 or imprisonment not less than thirty days, or both. Thus the matter stands. In the absence of a United States supreme court decision upon the point, it would be unsafe to make a generalization. But it is clear that there has been a reaction from Hall vs. Decuir [ante] . All the lower courts, both State and federal, are inclined to make the laws apply to all passengers, both intrastate and interstate, so long as they are within the borders of the State.
In In their requirements, the ordinances and regulations are practically the same as the statutes for all cities. All of them require that the accommodations for passengers of both races shall be equal. The three methods of separation are (1) separate cars, (2) partitioned cars, and (3) seats assigned to each race. The only city that unqualifiedly requires separate cars is Montgomery, Alabama. The ordinance was passed October 15, 1906, over the mayor's veto, he vetoing it because he believed it would be impracticable. When the law went into effect, November 23, the service was materially reduced because of the scarcity of cars [News and Observer, Raleigh, N. C., November 23, 1906]. The State laws of Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi give the choice of using two or more cars or partitioned cars. A number of the ordinances require that the cars be divided either by movable screens or partitions. They are movable so as to proportion the seating capacity to the requirements of each race. But in by far the greatest number of cases, the separation is accomplished by the conductor assigning white and colored passengers to different seats. Practically without exception, the colored passengers are required to seat from the rear to the front of the car; the white, from the front to the rear. On railroad cars, the colored passengers are almost invariably assigned to the front compartments. The colored passengers on street cars are seated in the rear, to give the reason as stated by the mayor of Birmingham, Alabama, to do " away with the disagreeable odors that would necessarily follow the breezes."
The penalty upon the conductor for failing or refusing to enforce the law varies all the way from a minimum fine of $1 in Montgomery, Alabama, to $500 in Jacksonville, Fla., or imprisonment from one to ninety days.
The liability of the company is equally heavy in proportion. Each trip made without providing for the requirements of the law is considered a separate offense. In Pensacola, Fla., the fine upon the company is $50 a day for not furnishing separate accommodations.
When a passenger consciously disobeys the law, he may be fined; and if he insists upon occupying the wrong seat, the conductor ejects him from the car. In that case, according to the Virginia law, "in case such passenger ejected shall have paid his fare upon said car, he shall not be entitled to any part of said fare."
The only phase of these Jim Crow street-car laws which has given rise to any appreciable discussion is the exemptions from application. Most of the States and cities simply except nurses in attendance upon the children or sick of the other race, the nurse going into the car to which the child or sick person belongs. Of course, the streetcar employees are excepted, and Virginia excepts officers in charge of prisoners and lunatics. But Florida and North Carolina say that the law shall not apply to colored nurses in attendance upon white children or white sick people [the italics are the writer's]; and Augusta, Ga., has the same in its ordinance. The constitutionality of the Florida law was tested two years ago in the supreme court of that State, and was declared to violate the fourteenth amendment [State v. Patterson, 39 S., p. 398]. The court said: "It gives to the Caucasian mistress the right to have her child attended in the Caucasian department of the car by its African nurse, and withholds from the African mistress the equal right to have her child attended in the African department by the Caucasian nurse." There is the same discrimination as to the invalid adult Caucasian attended by a colored nurse. As soon as the Florida State law was declared unconstitutional, the cities passed ordinances making the provision apply to nurses of either race. The North Carolina law has not yet been tested; but it has the same defect as the Florida law had.
